Gurmeet Kanwal?
The security situation in Afghanistan has gradually but perceptibly begun to slip out of control due to the rapid draw-down of coalition forces. The NATO-ISAF strategy to ?clear-hold-transfer-exit? has only partially succeeded in achieving its political and military goals. Due to structural as well as functional deficiencies, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF, army and police) are unlikely to be capable of assuming independent charge of security by the end of 2014.
Counter-insurgency operations are small-team operations in which success is heavily dependent on very high quality junior leadership. The standards of junior leadership in the ANSF leave much to be desired. Not only are the ANSF ill-trained and badly led, they are also poorly equipped.
The ANSF lack high mobility vehicles like the US ?humvees? and are incapable of launching quick reaction teams to either come to the aid of besieged patrols and ambush parties or to exploit fleeting opportunities. The Afghan army lacks firepower resources as it has not been given any artillery. In fact, combat service support elements like light helicopters for casualty evacuation are almost completely non-existent.
The rapid raising of new infantry battalions almost invariably results in a dilution in the quality of intake of recruits as the catchment area is limited. It also results in low standards of initial or basic training as the training period is reduced. Newly raised battalions in the best of armies take three to five years to settle down and build internal unit cohesion and esprit de corps.
Accurate and timely intelligence is the bedrock of successful counter-insurgency operations. The ANSF do not have an integral intelligence establishment and are dependent mainly on external sources. This is a major operational deficiency.
The desertion rate is higher than average in similar circumstances; many cases of fratricide have been reported and the Taliban have infiltrated their men into some of the battalions. Under these circumstances, morale and motivation levels are bound to slip further.
Hence, there is an urgent need to supplement the capabilities of the Afghan security forces. Unless the key regional neighbours, including India, Iran and Pakistan, contribute meaningfully to the efforts to stabilise the country, rather than pursuing narrow national agendas, Afghanistan may be plunged into civil war.
Pakistan still seeks ?strategic depth? in Afghanistan and would prefer to have a pliable regime in Kabul when the NATO-ISAF mission ends in 2014. Pakistan does not support the Afghan reconciliation process as a successful outcome will reduce Pakistan?s role in conflict resolution. Pakistan has failed to realise that continuing insurgency in Afghanistan is fuelling instability in its own northwest and will further destabilise the country when its economy is in ruins and the political situation is spiralling out of control. Pakistan seeks to limit India?s influence in Afghanistan and opposes the induction of Indian troops as well as in-situ training.
A peaceful and stable Afghanistan is of vital national interest for India. It is a country with which India has traditionally enjoyed warm and friendly relations. Since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001-02, India has contributed only soft power to the international reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. It has spent over US $1.5 billion in constructing the Delaram-Zaranj highway, building and running schools and hospitals and in training the fledgling Afghan administration.
As an aspiring, though reluctant regional power, India must overcome its fear of overseas military interventions ? occasioned by the ill-advised and unsuccessful foray into Sri Lanka in the 1980s ? and stand up and be counted as a genuine rising power that is willing to discharge legitimate regional responsibilities.
Under the right conditions ? Afghan government concurrence, UN flag, viable logistics support ? it may be possible to persuade India to send up to one infantry division (15,000 troops) to supplement the ANSF. A fresh UN Security Council mandate will be necessary under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
Pakistan will be extremely reluctant to accept Indian troops being positioned in the Jalalabad-Ghazni-Kandahar areas, which are the worst affected, as it will see such presence as a direct threat. It will be more prudent to send Indian troops to either Mazar-e-Sharif in the north or Herat in the west.
India could begin by inducting a brigade group to begin with and gradually step up the force level when a fully functional logistics system is in place ? either from the south through Chabahar Port (Iran)-Zaranj-Delaram-Garland Highway or from the north through Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan. Both the routes will present formidable challenges for logistics, but none that cannot be overcome with methodical planning.
At the very least, due to the Indian army?s immense experience in counter-insurgency operations and cultural affinities that make it easier to train new recruits, India could be invited to train ANA personnel in Afghanistan itself.
(The writer is a Delhi-based strategic analyst, former Director of CLAWS and Founding Member of South Asian Institute of Strategic Affairs (SAISA)
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Source: http://southasianidea.com/geopolitics/india-should-contribute-troops-for-afghan-peace/
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